‘This call never happened’: Ex-D.C. Guard leaders push back as internal Army report on Jan. 6 emerges
That assertion is directly contradicted by Sund’s congressional testimony and Matthews’ memo to the Jan. 6 committee.
Sund wanted as many riot-equipped personnel as possible to get to the Capitol and help reestablish a security perimeter around the outside of the building, according to Matthews. Before the attack had even started, Sund had chosen a specific location where those soldiers could meet up with the police officers they would support.
“Sund knew exactly what mission he wanted the DCNG personnel to perform,” Matthews wrote.
Riot gear ready
The Army report also says that members of the D.C. Guard, who were helping the city’s Metropolitan Police Department at Metro stations and traffic control points, were only ready to provide backup to police officers.
“The [D.C. National Guard] was prepared to provide the limited support requested by [the D.C. mayor’s Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency] and nothing more,” the Army report reads.
In other words, the Guard members weren’t ready for what was about to happen.
Yet those soldiers brought riot gear with them and stored it in their vehicles, according to multiple Guard officials.
“The Guardsmen who were stationed at traffic control points that day had civil disturbance gear that includes a shield, a vest, helmet, baton, shin guards,” Command Sgt. Maj. Michael Brooks with the D.C. Guard told POLITICO. “The leadership of the D.C. National Guard took it upon themselves to make sure equipment was readily available.”
The Guard members were fully trained as well, Matthews said.
“Guardsmen who were already on duty, were trained in civil disturbance response, already had area familiarization with Washington, DC, were properly kitted and were delayed only because of inaction and inertia at the Pentagon,” he wrote in his memo.
When asked about the existence of a plan for the DC National Guard crafted on Jan. 6 by then-Army Secretary Ryan McCarthy, Army spokesperson Brady said that the service’s “assistance was requested after the breach of the Capitol, following numerous assertions by DC civil authorities that it would not be required.”
“Therefore, the Army did not have the opportunity to deliberately plan as it routinely does,” Brady continued. “Instead, once the assistance of the [D.C. National Guard] was requested at the Capitol, Army leaders focused on real-time, hasty planning to get DCNG Soldiers to the vicinity of the Capitol so they could link up with civil authorities and provide assistance.”